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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a new and particularly well—suited body of data to
assess the impact of social security retirement benefits on private savings.
The Retirement History Survey combines survey evidence on the wealth of
couples in their early sIxties with detailed information from the administra-
tive records of the Social Security Administration on the lifetime earnings
of those individuals and the social security benefits to which they are
entitled. The present paper uses these data to estimate a model of the de-
termination of preretirement net worth. On balance, the estimates developed
in this study favor the extended life cycle model as a theory of asset
accumulation and indicate a substantial substitution of social security wealth
for private wealth accumulation.
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Social security benefits have become the principal method of financing
retirement consumption in the United States and probably in most other
industrial countries. For the majority of American families, the actuarial pre-
sent value of social security benefits exceeds the value of all other household
wealth. Measuring the effect of anticipated social security benefits on the
accumulation of wealth by individuals is therefore of fundamental importance for
both the verification of key economic theories and the analysis of major issues
of economic policy.
The principal idea in the economic theories of household consumption
and aggregate capital accumulation is the life cycle model suggested by Harrod
(1948) and developed by Modigliani (1954, 1957, 1970). The social security
program introduces large and exogenous variations from the traditional life
cycle pattern of income. The response of households to this lifetime redistri-
bution of income provides a potentially powerful test of the life cycle model.
Moreover, the incentives that the social security program provides for
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earlier retirement1 make it important to extend the traditional life cycle model
to make the age of retirement endogenous and then to test the savings implica-
tion of this extended theory.
The desirability of expanding or reducing the role of social security
in the financing of retirement consumption depends crucially on the extent to
which social security displaces private saving. If social security benefits
have no efffect on individual saving, the provision of substantial benefits can
eliminate poverty in old age with little or no adverse sideeffect.2 In the
opposite case in which the provision of social security benefits simply displa-
ces equivalent private annuities, the only effect of social securitywould be
the adverse one of reducing national saving.3 More generally, to the extent
that social security benefits reduce private saving, the loss from this must be
balanced against the gains in reducing poverty.
This present paper uses a new and particularly well-suited body of
data to assess the impact of social security benefits on private saving. These
data combine survey evidence on the wealth of individuals in their early sixties
1 Evidence of the powerful effect of the social security rules on retirement is
given by Boskin (1977), and Pellechio (1979).
2 This depends on the way in which benefits arefinanced and the extent to
which they distort retirement decisions.
Even a small reduction in saving involves a welfare loss if taxes oninvest-
ment income place a wedge between the pretax marginal rate of return on capi-
tal and consumers' marginal rates of time preference. More generally, there
is a welfare loss on each dollar of reduced net saving if the marginalsocial
return on capital exceeds the marginal rate of time preference. SeeFeldstein
(1977a).—3—
with detailed information from administrative records of the Social Security
Administration of the lifetime earnings of those individuals and the social
security benefits to which they are entitled.
The first section of the paper develops the implication of the
extended life cycle theory and indicates the types of inferences that can in
principle be made by analyzing the current set of data. Section 2 describes the
data and specification in more detail. The statistical estimation problems are
discussed and the results presented in the third section. There is then a brief
conclusi on.
1. Implications of the Extended Life Cycle Theory
The theoretical relationship between social security retirement bene-
fits and saving has been discussed in detail elsewhere (see Feldstein 1974,
1977b, 1979) and can be summarized here very briefly.
According to the traditional life cycle model, the individual maximi-
zes the utility of lifetime consumption subject to a lifetime budget constraint.
The solution to the individual's optimization problem implies a pattern of
saving during working years and of dissaving during retirement. The particular
time pattern depends on expected interest rates, the time path of labor income,
and the individual's preferences. An "actuarially—fair lump—sum" (AFLS) social
security program imposes a tax that reduces disposable labor income during the
individual's working years and returns those tax receipts during retirement
years with an increment equivalent to the interest that the individual would-4-
have earned. By definition, an actuarially—fair lump-sum program leaves the
individual's lifetime budget unchanged and also leaves all relative prices
unchanged. The solution to the individual's optimization plan therefore con-
tinues to imply the same lifetime path of consumption. The social security tax
reduces saving dollar-for-dollar as it is paid and the social security benefits
finance the consumption that would have been paid for by dissaving.
Relaxing the assumption that the program is actuarially fair modifies
the conclusion only slightly. If the actuarial present value of the benefits is
less than the present value of the taxes, the lifetime budget constraint is
reduced. Individuals will in general consume less in every year. The reduction
in saving would therefore be less than one-for-one. Conversely, a better than
actuarially fair program would induce even greater dissaving during the early years.
A more basic challenge to the prediction of reduced private saving
comes from those who reject the life cycle model of rational saving. According
to this alternative view, individuals are myopic and save irrationally if at
all. Saving reflects a delayed adjustment of consumption to rising income, a
satisficing level of consumption based on the imitation of a reference group,
the result of mortgage repayment or other contractual obligations, or the out-
come of following arbitrary rules of thumb. The implication of this viewis
that only social security prevents individuals from reaching old age with insuf-
ficient resources.1 Katona (1965), Pechrrian et. al. (1968) and others have even
1 Diamond (1977) presents evidence on the low level of private assets of the aged
but does not distinguish between the assets that exist in the presence of
social security and the assets that would otherwise exist. See Kotlikoff and
Summers (1980) for a critical analysis of the Diamond argument and evidence
on the relation of total retirement assets to preretirement consumptionlevels.- 5-.
argued that social security, by reminding people of the importance of providing
for old age, may induce them to save more.
Some aspects of this view can be tested explicitly with the data that
are available for the current study. The analysis presented below shows how the
assets accumulated by a couple in their early sixties is related to their life-
time earnings and the social security benefits to which they are entitled.
According to the "myopic and irrational" view of saving, a higher level of
social security benefits should have no effect on lifetime asset accumulation.
A significant negative effect of anticipated social security benefits on asset
accumulation would be clear evidence in favor of the life cycle theory.1
Even within the framework of the traditional life cycle model, there
are at least four reasons why the actual impact of social security may differ
from the one-for-one replacement implied by the simplest form of the life cycle
model ':(1)Social security is a restricted asset: it is illiquid, cannot be
given away or bequeathed, and cannot be used as collateral for a loan. For
these reasons, social security wealth is likely to replace less than an equal
value of private wealth. (2) Social security provides a real annuity and may
therefore be a more effective replacement. (3) Anticipated social security
benefits are not contractual and may be revised by legislative action;
1 Ofcourse, individuals may differ in the extent to which they are rational
life-cyclers. The estimated coefficient measures the overall net effect.
Note also that the coefficient of the social security benefits variable
measures the effect of inter-individual differences in social security and does
not preclude the possibility that the provision of social security per se
induces a recognition of the need for individual retirement planning which
increases saving.
2 These ideasare discussed more fully in Feldstein and Pellechio (1979).-6-
pessimists will regard the current legislation as an overstatment of likely benefits
while optimists will expect further increases in benefit levels. (4) Induced
changes in private intergenerational transfers may offset the public transfers of the
social security program.'
Although these characteristics can influence the magnitude of the effect of
social security on private wealth accumulation, they do not alter the expected direc-
tion of that effect. However, if the traditional life cycle model is replaced by a
more general "extended life cycle" theory, even the direction of the effect of
social security becomes theoretically ambiguous. In particular, as I have noted in
earlier writing (e.g., Feldstein, 1974), dropping the assumptions that the period of
retirement is fixed and that social security benefits and taxes are of a lump-sum
character nakes the effect of social security ambiguous. In particular, the provi-
sion of social security benefits may induce earlier retirement2 which in turn
increases the incentive to save. The net effect of social security in this extended
life-cycle model depends on the balance between the induced retirement effect and the
asset substitution effect. Because the asset substitution effect may be weakened by
the four factors rioted in the previous paragraph, the induced retirement effect might
possibly be the dominant influence.3
1This point has been emphasized by Barro (1974, 1978) and discussed in
Feldstein (1978, 1979). New evidence on the limited empirical relevance
of offsetting private transfers is presented in Feldstein (1980).
2The incentive for earlier retirement is obvious when the provision of social
security benefits is conditional on retirement or reduced earnings as it is in
the United States. But even if there is no "retirement test", the provision of
substantial benefits will induce earlier retirement if it is not possible to
borrow against such benefits; the U.S. law prevents the use of social security
benefits as security for a loan.
3More generally, the extended life cycle model with endogenous labor supply
also recognizes that labor supply and earnings during preretirement years may
respond to the social security program. The nature of this response will
depend on the extent to which the additional earnings cause higher tax payments
and the extent to which those tax payments lead to higher retirement benefits.
The incentives for earlier retirement raise the relative reward for work at
younger ages and may increase labor supplyduring those years.—7—
In considering this possibility, however, it is important to
distinguish between the total effect of social security and the effect of
niarginal changes in social security benefits. The social security program as
a whole may have induced a substantial increase in retirement while the current
extent of variations in benefits among individuals has a much smaller effect on
retirement. To the extent that the marginal effect on retirement behavior is
small relative to the average effect, the negative asset substitution effect is
likely to dominate.1
Because of these sources of ambiguity, empirical analysis of the
relation between social security benefits and household wealth accumulation
cannot provide clear evidence against a general extended life cycle model. An
empirical finding that social security had no effect on households' accumulation
of private wealth would not imply that individuals are irrational or myopic but
might simply reflect the offsetting effects of countervailing factors. Despite
these limitations, the empirical analysis can potentially provide evidence in
favor of the extended life cycle model. If the data imply that social security
depresses household wealth accumulation, this provides strong evidence infavor
of the life cycle hypothesis and against the view that saving is irrational or
myopic. Evidence that total wealth accumulation is an increasing function of
both age and lifetime income would also support the life cycle model.
11t is, of course, the marginal effect of changes in benefits that is
relevant to thepolicyissue of the optimal size of the social security
program.-8-
Quite apart from itscontributionto clarifying the theory of saving,
measuring theimpactof potential changes in social security is of substantial
practical importance because of the large magnitude of the Social Security
program.For the majority of American households, the present actuarial value
of future social security benefits exceeds all other net wealth combined. In
the aggregate, this social security "wealth" reached $4 trillion in 1977,
more than two-thirds of all other private wealth. Moreover, the total tax
collections of the social security program ($97 billion in 1979) nearly equal
total private saving in all forms ($106billion in 1979).
Nosingle study can provide a definitive estimate of the impact of
social security or of the appropriateness of the extended life cycle model.
My previous studies imply that social security does replace private wealth
accumulation by somewhere between 50 cents and one dollar for every dollar of
"social security wealth," i.e., for every dollar of actuarial present value of
future social security benefits.1 These studies thus providesubstantial
supportfor the life cycle approach. Although some other researchers have
reported smaller or non-existent effectsof social security, I believethat
theirconclusions are generally based on misspecified models; these analyses
are examined in Feldstein (1979)andneed not be discussed again here.
The current study, based on a new and different type of data, provides
1Thesestudies are summarized in Feldstein, (1979).provides further support for my earlier conclusions about the impact of social
security and, because of the much more complete information on lifetime earnings
than was available in previous studies, further evidence about the
appropriateness of the life-cycle model.
2.TheData, Specifications and Definitions
In 1969, the Social Security Administration and the Census Bureau
collected extensive information on a sample of individuals who were born between
1905 and 1911. The individuals in the sampling universe excluded married women,
i.e., information was collected on unmarried men and women and on couples in
which the man was between the ages of 58 and 63. The Social Security
Administration then augmented each survey record with information from the
Social Security Administration files on annual earnings in each year since 1951
and the total of earnings between 1937 and 1950.1
The analysis in this paper focuses on married couples only. Since
most of the unmarried individals in the sample are widows or widowers, a
separate specification of their wealth accumulation behavior would be required
to reflect such things as life insurance proceeds, the earnings of the deceased
spouse, remarriage, etc.
The sample is also restricted to couples in which neither spouse was
self-employed or employed by the government. Self-employed individuals are
1 The data are officially knownas the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey
and are described in (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1976). Each individual in the sample was reinterviewed every other year
through 1979. The data that I had when this study began included only the
survey of 1969 and the administration records through 1974.-10-
likely to save very differently, particularly if their self-eniploynientinvolves
a business with significant physical assets. Employeesof the federal govern-
ment and of many state and local governments are not covered bysocial security
but have separate public pensions instead. This exclusion wasmade if either the
husband or the wife was classified as self-employed or a government employeein
1969, in his or her previous job, or in the job that he orshe had held for the
longest period of time.
A relatively small number of additional couples wereeliminated
because of inadequate records; e.g., because the earningsrecord was incomplete,
the age was apparently incorrect, the "value of house" question wasnot answered
in an acceptable way, or the number of quarters required toreach the maximum
covered earnings was not feasible. The final sample contains2087 couples.
The traditional life cycle model implies that the networth (NW) of
individuals at retirement age should be a function of lifetime earnings, or,
more precisely, of the accumulated value oflifetime earnings as of that
date (LE)) Under certain more restricted conditions, it canbe shown that
the net worth of individual (or couple) i will be a linearfunction of this
accumulated value:
(1) NW1 =+ i LEi+e1
where e1 isa random variable that reflects differencesin investment
experience,tastes, etc.
'The "accumulated value" is the analog of a discounted value; earnings at
earlier dates are accumulated with interest to the dateof retirement.In
applying this concept in the current paper,since everyone has not reached
retirement agethe variable LE includesboth theaccumulated value of previous
earnings and the discounted actuarial valueof earnings until age 65. The text
thatfollows provides more informationon the construction of this variable.—11-.
Theextended life cycle model implies that the accumulation of
private net worth is "reduced" by some fraction of "social security wealth"
(SSW), i.e.,, the actuarial present value of the benefits to which the couple
is entitled at age 65:1
(2) MW = + LE1
+2SSWj +e
If the wealth replacement effect of social security outweighs the induced
retirement effect, 2 will be negative and presumably between zero and minus
one. Of course, as Section 1 explained, other values of 2 are theoretically
possible.
Three modifications of this specification are worth considering.
First, the accumulation of net worth may depend on the time sequence of
earnings and not just the accumulated value. This will be true when the rate
of return on assets differs over the individual's lifetime or when the actual
evolution of earnings differs from what was expected when the individual entered
the labor force. Although it is not possible to incorporate all this informa-
tion, some indication of differences in the time patterns of earnings can be
allowed for by including the ratio of current earnings to accumulated life-
time earnings (CE/LE) as a factor influencing the fraction of lifetime earnings
that is saved to finance retirement consumption and bequests:2
1 The calculation of social security wealth for each couple in the sample
isdescribed below.
2Itwould in principle be possible to do more by comparing each couple's
earningshistory with a standard lifetime evolution of earnings and then
examining how "surprises" influenced the final accumulation of wealth.
Alternatively,the LE variable of equation 2 might be replaced by several
accumulated values corresponding to differentportions of the individual's
life.-12-
(3)NW1 =13U + + 133(CE/LE)] LE1 +2SSWj +e
Second, among those who are not yet at retirement age, the ratio
of net worth to accumulated earnings should be an increasing function of age.
Since everyone in the sample is not exactly the same age (although all of the
men are between 58 and 63 years old) the specification should be generalized to
permit variation with age:
(4) NW1 = + + 133(CE/LE) +13yAGEH +135AGEW] LE1 +2SSW1 +e
where AGEH is the husband's age and AGEW is the wife's age.
Finally, theassumptionthat the relationship between net worth and
lifetime earnings is linear can be relaxed in favor of a more general second-
order specification of the form:
(5) NW = + + 133(cE/LE) +134AGEH+
135AGEWi +6LEi] LE +2S5W +
Ofcourse, even this more general specification may not reflect the proper non-
linear relation between net worth and lifetime earnings. Since social security
wealth is itself related to lifetime earnings in a nonlinear way, there is
always the possibility that the estimated coefficent of social security wealth
reflects in part the spurious effect of incorrectly specifying the relation
between lifetime income arid net worth. This problem of underidentification or
nisspecification is, of course, a very common one in all empirical analysis
since the explicit functional form can rarely if ever be specified with
certai nty.-13-
The value of net worth (NW) used to estimate this equation is the
sum of the values of all assets net .of the values of all liabilities as
reported in the survey questionnaire. Assets include financial assets, real
estateand other investment property but exclude the value of cars and other
household articles. Unfortunately, thesurvey collected no information on the
valueof private pensions.For some couples, this asset is substantial and its
omissionmay bias the estimated coefficients of the other variablesin general
and of the social security wealth variable in particular. The sign of the bias
in the coefficient of SSW depends on whether there is a positive or negative
partial correlation between private pension wealth and social security wealth
(given the values of the other variables in the equation.)
If the partial correlation between social security wealth and private
pension wealth (given lifetime earnings and age) is negative, the estimated
coefficient of social security wealth will be biased toward zero.1 since social
security benefits are based on income up to a limit while private pensions
coverage tends to be greater for high income workers, the partial correlation is
likely to be negative. Unfortunately, the information on the joint distribution
of lifetime earnings, pension wealth and social security wealth that is needed
to resolve this question fully is not available. It is perhaps reassuring
therefore that the bias is likely to cause an underestimate of the effect of
social security and that the typical values of private pension benefits among
individuals born around 1910 were much smaller than for more recent cohorts.
'This assumes that social security wealth and private pension wealth affect
the accumulation of fungible net worth (NW) in the same direction; i.e.,
both discourage or both encourage the accumulation of other forms of net
worth.-14-
Unlike previous survey data which contained only current or recent
earnings, the Retirement History Survey has the earnings histories of the
husband and wife based on Social Security Administration records for each
year between 1951 and 1974. Although this represents a much richer body of
information than has previously been available, there are still several
serious measurement problems in evaluating the accumulated lifetime earnings
variable.First, earnings in each year are reported only upto the taxable
maximumunder the Social Security law. More than 80 percent of individuals
have earnings below this limit. For the remaining individuals, the
administrativerecord shows the quarter of the year in which the maximum is
reached and this information is used to estimate total annual earnings.1
This process introduces a random error in the measurement of high incomes and
causes a systematic understatement of the highest incomes. There is a further
problem of misestimation for individuals whose earnings exceeded the taxable
maximum and who also had more than one employer.
Asecond source of bias is introduced by the restriction of earnings
tothe amount obtained in employment covered by the Social Security program.
For individuals who worked temporarily for the government or in other un-
covered sectors (not all private occupations and industries were covered
in the first decade of the earnings history information), the calculated value
of LE underestimates the true value of accumulated earnings.
'This method estimation is described in Fox (1976).—15—
A third problem is that the detailed earnings history is not
available for years before 1951, a year in which the men in the sample were
between the ages of 40 and 46. The only information on earnings in previous
years is the sum of all covered earnings between1937 when the social security
program was established and 1950. Because of the importanceof military service
during this period, there is no way to distribute these earnings among
individual years. The total pre-1951 earnings are therefore included in the
lifetime earnings variable as if they were earned in 1951.
Finally, there is no information on the bequests or gifts that
individuals receive. Although this is likely to be a small amount for most
individuals, it represents a further source of measurement error in the
lifetime budget constraint.
The earnings for each year were restated in 1969 dollars and accumu-
lated (or discounted) to 1969 using a three percent interest rate. Differences
in the actual real rate of return that couples obtained over their lifetime is
a further source of substantial error in measuring the true lifetime budget
constrai nt.
Finally, lifetime earnings are calculated on the basis of earnings
through age 65, i.e., everyone is assumed to retire at age 65 unlesshe or she
has already stopped working before that age. Since the actual earnings history
through 1974 is available in the Retirement History Survey record and the
youngest man is then 63, relatively little extrapolation is needed to complete
earnings profiles through age 65 for the entire sample. The required extra-
polation assumes that earnings grow at a rate of five percent a year.-16-
Despite these problems in measuring the accumulated value of
lifetime earnings, the detailed earnings histories provide sufficientinformation
to calculate quite precisely the real social security benefits to whicheach
couple would be entitled at age 65 and beyond. With this information,social
security wealth (SSW) was defined as the present actuarialvalue as of 1969 of
the benefits to which the couple would be entitled if both were retired when
the man reached age 65 net of the social security taxes to be paidbetween
1969 and retirement at age 65 or before. These benefits include the potential
survivor's benefit as well as the regular retirement and dependent's benefits.
Since benefits are automatically adjusted for changes in the price level,in-
flation was ignored and the benefits were discounted at a real rate ofthree
percent. Thecalculationof benefits uses the Social Security law as of
1971 (when the youngest beneficiary reached 65) and therefore reflectsthe quite
substantial increase in future benefits that was enacted in 1969.Since this
increase represented a departure from previous benefit-income ratios,the
calculated social security wealth values are probably higher (by10 to 20
percent) than most individuals would have anticipated onthe basis of the
previous history of this program.
Before turning to the estimated equations, it is useful toreview
the characteristics of the sample couples. The mean net worthof these couples
in 1969 was $23,682, or approximately seven times disposableincome
per capita for the population as a wholein that year. The standard deviation
of $62,445indicatesvery substantial variation around this mean.The average
value of social security wealth was approximately twice as large, 45,194,—17—
with a relatively small standard deviation of $7,068. Total wealth available
to finance retirement consumption therefore averaged $68,875, plus the unobserved
value of private pension wealth.
It is interesting to compare this retirement wealth with lifetime
earnings. The average accumulated value of lifetime earnings was $244,566 with
a standard deviation of $132,926. The average value of net worth plus social
security wealth therefore equaled about 25 percent of accumulated lifetime
earnings. Thus more than one-fifth of total lifetime resources was available
for consumption after the normal retirement age.
Finally, the current 1969 earnings per couple averaged $7,9l0 with
a standard deviation of$7,003; this variability reflects the fact that some of
sample were already wholly or partly retired.
3. Parameter Estimates
This section presents estimates of the parameters of equations 4 and 5.
These estimates imply that higher levels of social security wealth reduce the
accumulation of ordinary wealth. In the specification of equation 4, in which
the accumulation of ordinary net worth is proportional to lifetime earnings,
each extra dollar of social security wealth reduces private wealth accumulation
by approximately one dollar. With the nonlinear specification of equation 5,
in which the accumulation of ordinary net worth is a quadratic function of
lifetime earnings, the greater colinearity between social security wealth and
the lifetime earnings variables makes precise inference more difficult. The point-18-
estimates with this specification also imply that higher levels of social
security wealth reduce the accumulation or ordinary wealth but each extra
dollar of social security wealth reduces private wealth accumulation by
approximately 50 cents.
In addition to ordinary least squares estimates, this section also
presents both instrumental variable estimates and estimates with a heteroske-
dasticity transformation. Table 1 presents the OLS and I.V. estimates of the
untransformed specification o.
Equation 1.1 implies that each additional dollar of social security
wealth reduces the accumulation of ordinary net worth by 1.11 dollars. The
standard error of 0.24 implies that the substitution is not significantly
different from one-for-one. Conventional inference rules imply that there
is less than one chance in ten that each additional dollar of social security
wealth replaces less than 75 cents of ordinary wealth.
The other coefficients of equation 1.1 are plausible and consistent
with a priori expectations. An additional dollar of lifetime earnings raises
net worth by -0.54 +6.84l0 AGEH +4.58i° AGEW; evaluating this at the
mean values of AGEH (61 years) and AGEW (57 years) implies thateach dollar
of additional lifetime earnings raises net worth by 14 cents. An additional
year of age for the husband or wife has a positivebut small effect. Adding
a year to the ages of both husband and wife raises net worth by11.42 per
1,000 of lifetime earnings. Since net worth averages about 250 per 1,000
of lifetime earnings, the increase is relatively small. Finally, the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tohave a bigger effect on wealth accumulation than earlier earnings that
made the same contribution to the accumulated value of lifetime earnings.
Equation 1.2 adds the quadratic term in lifetime earnings. Its
coefficient is statistically significant and has an economically plausible
value. The new specification implies that each additional dollar of lifetime
earnings raises net worth by 9 cents at the mean value of lifetime earnings.
For a couple with lifetime earnings equal to the mean plus one standard
deviation, this increases from 9 cents to 14 cents; with lifetime earnings
one standard deviation below the mean, the 9 cents drop to4 cents.
The coefficient of social security wealth is now substantially lower,
only -0.35. The standard error implies that a 50 percentconfidence interval
stretches from -0.27 to -0.53; there is approximately one chance in 10of
observing this estimate if the true value of the coefficientis positive.
The errors in the measurement of lifetime earnings that were discussed
in the previous section could make these OLS estimates biased and inconsistent.
Even though the social security wealth variable itself is measured quite
accurately, the estimate of its coefficient can be inconsistentif the lifetime
earnings variable is measured with error since the twovariables are correlated.
Thisinconsistency can in principle be eliminated by instrumentalvariable
estimation. Since there is no natural instrumental variable in theavailable
data (i.e., a variable that is highlycorrelated with true lifetime earnings
butuncorrelated with the measurement error in the constructedmeasure of
lifetimeearnings), Ihaveused an extension of Wald's (1940)method.-21-
More specifically,the range of the lifetime earnings variable is divided into
four sections and binary variables are used to denote each section; three such
binary variables are then included in the instrument set. If the division into
four sections corresponded to the true lifetime earnings, this procedure would
be fully consistent. In reality since the classification is not perfect,
the estimates are still inconsistent but should have smaller assymptotic bias
than the O.L.S. estimates. The other variables in the instrument set
are social security wealth, current earnings and the two age variables.
Excluded from the instrument set are therefore lifetime earnings, the product
of lifetime earnings with each age variable, and the square of lifetime
earni nys.
The instrumental variable estimates are presented in equations
1.3 and 1.4 of Table 1. The absolute size of the lifetime earnings coefficents
are increased, suggesting that the O.L.S. estimates were subject to the usual
type of errors in variables bias (toward zero). The coefficients of the social
security wealth variable change relatively little with both estimates moving
in the direction of minus one.
The very substantial variation in all of the key variables suggests
that the residuals are likely to be heteroskedastic and, more specifically,
that the variance of the residuals is likely to be an increasing function of
lifetime earnings. This implies that O.L.S. estimation gives too much weight
to the couples with high lifetime earniigs. The reasonable assumption that-22-
the standard deviation of the residual is proportional to accumulated lifetime
earnings implies that the heteroskedasticity can be eliminated by dividing all
of the variables (including the constant term) by accumulated lifetime earnings.
Unfortunately, this transformation is likely to exacerbate the errors
in variables problem. In particular, dividing social security wealth by
accumulated lifetime earnings introduces a correlation between that variable
and the error in the other variables that depend on lifetime earnings. The
use of a consistent alternative to 0.L.S. estimation may therefore by important
with this transformed specification even though the use of instrumental
variables had relatively little effect with the undeflated specification of
Table 1. Two approaches to instrumental variable estimation were tried. The
first method extends the Wald -typeprocedure by creating three additional
binary variables on the basis of the ratio of social security wealth to life-
time earnings. More specifically, these variables indicate whether the ratio
is: less than 0.15; 0.15 to 0.20; or 0.20 to 0.35. The appropriateness of
these six binary variables (i.e. the three based on lifetime earnings and the
three based on the social security wealth ratio) depends on the extent of
measurement error. Unfortunately, the ratio of social security wealth to
lifetime earnings might well be misclassified. Although these estimates should
have a smaller asymptotic bias than the OLS estimates, the remaining bias could
still be large.
The second method, which also builds on Wald's procedure, sacrifices
efficiency in order to achieve essentially complete consistency. The sample
is divided into three groups according to the ratio of social security wealth-23-
to lifetime earnings: less than 0.15; 0.15 to 0.35; and greater than 0.35.
The observations in the middle group are then discarded. A single binary
variablecorresponding to the low group is then used as an instrumental
variable. Since there is onlya very small probability of misclassifying
acouple with a low true ratio of social securitywealth to lifetime earnings
asa highratio couple or vice versa, the estimates produced inthis way should
havea substantially smaller asymptotic bias. Although a substantial fraction
ofthe sample is sacrificed by this procedure, the remaining sample has 806
observations.
Table 2 presentsresults for the three kinds of estimators:
ordinaryleast squares; instrumentalvariables; and the third method, which
Iwill refer to as the Wald procedure. The column captions show the
variablesas they appear in equations 4 and 5 of the text and then, in
square brackets, the actual regression variables in the deflated estimation
equati on.
Thebasicordinary least squares estimates in equation 2.1 are
generally very insignificant and have very little explanatory power. Only the
coefficients of current earnings and of the wife's age exceed their standard
errors. The other coefficients generally differ in order of magnitude or sign
from the corresponding coefficients in Table 1. The same discrepancy and lack
of statistical significance prevail in equation 2.2 when the quadratic effect
of lifetime earnings is introduced. Since deflation to correct for heteroske-
dasticity is intended to incease the efficiency of the estimates and not to
correct for biases, the change in coefficients between Tables 1 and 2 indicates
that something more than heteroskedasticity is involved. In particular, it


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Theinstrumental variable estimates presented in equation 2.3 tend
to confirm this diagnosis. The coefficients of this equation are quite similar
to the coefficients of the undeflated equation 1.3 that is also estimated by
the method of instrumental variables. Although the explanatory power of the
equation remains low, each of the coefficients is more than twice its standard
error. The coefficient of the social security wealth variable, -0.91, is quite
similar to the -1.04 obtained in the undeflated specification.
Adding the extra lifetime earnings variable causes substantial changes
in the other coefficients. The coefficient of the social security variable
dropsin absolute value to a trivial -0.03 with a standard error of 0.46.
The coefficient of the current earning variable becomes implausibly negative
and insignificant. The husband's age variable also becomes negative and
insignificant.Indeed, the only coefficient that exceeds its standard error
is the new accrued lifetime earnings variable itself. One interpretation is
that this is the correct specification, i.e., that age, current earnings and
social security wealth are all irrelevant and that the ratio of net worth to
lifetime earnings is determined primarily by the level of lifetime income.
My own belief is that such a specification is implausible on a priori grounds
and that the parameter estimates of equation 2.4 are the result of either
inadequate instrumental variables or the fact that the lifetime earnings
variable is the only variable in the transformed specification with a
substantial range of variation.—26-
The Wald estimators, presented in equations 2.5 and 2.6, support
this view. These coefficients imply a significant role for ageand social
security wealth as well as lifetime earnings asdeterminants of accumulated
net worth. The coefficients in equation 2.5 are generallysimilar to those
of the instrumental variable estimates of equation 2.3.The coefficient of the
social security wealth variable is -1.34 which, with a standard errorof 0.39,
is not significantly different from minus one. When the quadraticeffect is
introduced in equation 2.6, the other coefficients remain qualitativelysimilar.
In particular, the social security coefficient becomes -0.72with a standard
deviation of 0.58. The age variables remain positive and are only slightly
diminished in magnitude. The impact of a change in lifetime earningsalso
remains similar when evaluated at the mean value of lifetime earnings.
The two final equations of Table 2 are based on the samecensored
sample that was used with the Wald procedure butthe estimation is by ordinary
least squares. These coefficients confirm that it isthe consistent instrumental
variable aspect of Wald's procedure and not the nature ofthe sample that
produces the estimates of equation 2.5 and2.6.
4. Conclusion
This paper has examined a very rich body of data onsocial security
benefits, lifetime earnings, histories, and networth accumulation. The
estimated net worth equations provide quite strong supportfor the extended
life cycle model in general and for the specific hypothesisthat increased
social security benefits reduce private wealth accumulation.-27—
The estimated magnitude of the effect of social security wealth
depends on the specification of the equation and the method of estimation.
In the most basic linear specification, the data imply that each dollar of
additional social security wealth reduces private wealth accumulation by
approximately one dollar. This is true of both the ordinary least squares
and instrumental' variable estimates; when the variables are all deflated
to reduce heteroskedasticity, the same dollar-for—dollar substitution is
found when the coefficients are estimated by an instrumental variable method
or a iriethod based on Wald's procedure.
A more general specification, with a quadratic effect of lifetime
earnings, was also estimated. The increased colinearity makes it more
difficult to estimate the coefficients of the other variables, particularly
when all of the variables are deflated by lifetime earnings. Moreover, the
deflated estimates seem particularly subject to the problem of measurement
error and the estimates of all the coefficients are quite sensitive to the
method of estimation. The estimated coefficient of social security wealth
was also unstable but varied between -0.35 and -0.72 in the equations in
which the other parameters had plausible values. More generally, the estimates
show the importance of using a consistent estimation procedure that is quite
robust with respect to substantial measurement error.-28
On balance, the estimates in this study favor the extended life cycle
model as a theory of asset accumulation and indicate a substantial substitution
of social security wealth for private wealth accumulation. It is unnecessary
to repeat all of the caveats that were discussed in earliersections. The
nonexperimental character of economic research makes it almostinevitable that
no single study can provide a decisive test of a theory or aconclusive
measurement of a key parameter. Only by combining evidence fromseveral studies




Barro, Robert (1974), "Are Government Bonds Net Worth?" Journal of
Political Economy (November/December), vol. 82, no. 6, pp.1095—117.
____________(1978),"The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving,"
The American Enterprise Institute Studies, No. 199.
Boskin, Michael J. (1977), "Social Security and Retirement Decisions,"
Economic Inquiry (January), Vol. 15, No. 1.
Diamond, Peter (1977), "A Framework for Social Security Analysis," Journal
of Public Economics, 8:3, December, pp.275—98.
Feldstein, Martin (1974), "Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate
Capital Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82,
No.5, September/October, pp.905—926.
________________(l977a),"Does the U.S. Save Too Little?" American
Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, February 1977, pp.116—21.
________________(l977b),"Social Security and Private Savings: International
Evidence in an Extended Life—Cycle Model," in The Economics of
Public Services, an International Economic Association Conference
Volume, M. Feldstein and R. Inman (eds.).
_______________(1978),"Social Security and Private Savings: Reply to
Barro,"audies in Social Security and Retirement Policy, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
________________(1979),"The Effect of Social Security on Saving," The
1979 Frank Paish Lecture to the British Association of University
Teachers of Economics, forthcoming.
_______________(1980),"Social Security, Government Debt and Inter-
generational Transfers: Some Direct Evidence" (forthcoming).
______________andAnthony J. Pellechio (1979), "Social Security and
Household Wealth Accumulation: New Microeconometric Evidence,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. LXI, No. 3, pp.361—68.—30—
Fox, Alan (1976), Alternative Measures of Earnings Replacementfor Social
Security Benefits, from Reaching Retirement Age, Research Report
No.47, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security
Administration, Government Printing Office. (Appears as part of
Appendix F, Methodology for Chapter 14.)
Harrod, R, (1948), Towards a Dynamic Economics. London:Macmillan.
Katona, C. (1965), "Private Pensions and Individual Saving,"Survey
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan.
Kotlikoff, Laurence and Lawrence Summers (l980),"Do PeopleSave Adequately
for Their Retirement?" National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper (forthcoming).
Modigliani, Franco (1970), "The Life Cycle Hypothesisof Saving and
Intercountry Differences in the Saving Ratio," in W.A. Eltis
etal. (ed.), Induction, Growth and Trade, Essays in Honorof Sir
Roy Harrod, Oxford.
________________andA. ndo (1957), "Tests of the Life Cycle Hypothesis of
Savings," Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute ofStatistics
(May), Vol.19, pp.99—104.
________________andR. Brumberg (1954), "Utility Analysis and the Consumption
Function:An Interpretation of Cross—Section Data" in K. Kurihara
(ed.), Post Keynesian Economics, New Brunswick.
Pechman, J., H. Aaron and M. Taussig (1968), Social SecurityLPerspectives
for Reform. Washington: The Brookings Instituttion.
Pellechio, Anthony J. (1979), "Social Security Financingand Retirement
Behavior," American Economic Review, Vol.69, No. 2, pp.284—87—31—
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1976), Almost 65:
Baseline Data from the Retirement History Study. Washington, D.C.
Wald, A. (1940), "The Fitting of Straight Lines if Both Variables are
Subject to Error," Annals of Mathematical Statistics, pp.284—300.